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NOTE
WHY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S RULING IN
KYLLO v. UNITED STATES' IS NOT THE FINAL WORD ON
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THERMAL IMAGING
In 1991 Agent William Elliott of the United States Department of
Interior began to suspect that Danny Kyllo was using his home for the
indoor cultivation of marijuana.2 This suspicion arose out of findings
gleaned by a joint task force organized to investigate a possible mari-
juana production and distribution ring.3 The initial investigation cen-
tered on Sam Shook, the father of Kyllo's neighbor.4 After discovering
information that suggested Kyllo's involvement in the growing and dis-
tribution of marijuana, Agent Elliott contacted Oregon state law
enforcement officers who provided him with additional information
that strengthened the suspicions against Kyllo.5 Agent Elliot subpoe-
1. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001).
2. Id. at 2041.
3. United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787, 789 (D. Or. 1992), affd in part,
United States v. Kyllo, 26 F.3d 134 (9th Cir. 1994), opinion superseded, United States v.
Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th
Cir. 1998), opinion withdrawn, United States v. Kyllo, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999),
opinion superseded, United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000), rev'd, Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct.
2038 (2001). The joint task force was comprised of the United States Department of
Interior, the Bureau of Land Management, the Tillamook County Sheriffs Department,
and the Oregon State Police Bureau.
4. See id. The investigation of Sam Shook eventually began to focus on Tova
Shook who resided at 890 Rhododendron Drive, Florence Oregon. Kyllo resided at
878 Rhododendron Drive.
5. United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1998), opinion
withdrawn, United States v. Kyllo, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion superseded,
United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, Kyllo v. United
States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000), rev'd, Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001).
The information included that: Kyllo lived with his wife, Luanne, in one unit of a
triplex in Florence Oregon, the triplex was also occupied by others who were suspects
in the drug investigation, Kyllo allegedly told a police informant that he and Luanne
could supply the informant with marijuana, and the previous month, Luanne had been
arrested for delivery and possession of a controlled substance.
1
Hardee: Why the United States Supreme Court's Rule in Kyllo v. United Sta
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2001
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
naed Kyllo's utility records and compared the use of electricity in
Kyllo's triplex with a chart developed by the Portland General Electric
Company.6 That chart serves as a guide for estimating average power
usage relative to square footage, type of heating and accessories, and
the number of people living in the residence.7 Based upon the compar-
isons between average electrical usage and Kyllo's utility records, Elliot
concluded that Kyllo's use was abnormally high, a common indicator
of indoor marijuana cultivation.8 In order to determine if heat was
emanating from Kyllo's home in levels consistent with the use of high
intensity bulbs required for indoor growth, Elliott requested Staff Ser-
geant Daniel Haas of the Oregon National Guard to examine the triplex
with an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imaging device.9 The scan
was conducted from the passenger seat of Elliott's vehicle from across
the street in front of Kyllo's house as well as from the street behind the
house.' The scan showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall
of petitioner's home radiated more heat than the rest of the home and
were substantially warmer than the neighboring homes of the tri-
plex.11 Elliott and Haas concluded that the emanating heat indicated
Kyllo was using halide lights to grow marijuana in his house. 12 Based
upon the thermal imaging, utility bills, and tips from informants, Elliot
was able to obtain a warrant authorizing the search of petitioner's
home. 3 The search led to the discovery of an indoor growing opera-
tion involving more than 100 marijuana plants. 4 Kyllo's motion to
6. United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787, 790 (D. Or. 1992), affd in part,
United States v. Kyllo, 26 F.3d 134 (9th Cir. 1994), opinion superseded, United States v.
Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th
Cir. 1998), opinion withdrawn, United States v. Kyllo, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999),
opinion superseded, United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000), rev'd, Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct.
2038 (2001).
7. Id. at 790.
8. See United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8th Cir. 1994). Indoor
marijuana growth is dependent upon high intensity light bulbs that use between four
hundred and one thousand-watt bulbs. Use of high intensity bulbs will result in
greater electricity use.
9. United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir. 1998), opinion withdrawn,
United States v. Kyllo, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion superseded, United
States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, Kyllo v. United States, 530
U.S. 1305 (2000), rev'd, Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001).
10. Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2041 (2001).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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suppress the seized evidence was denied, and thereafter he entered a
conditional guilty plea. 15
After a tangled procedural history, bouncing back and forth
between the Federal District Court in Oregon and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, 6 the United Supreme Court granted certiorari in
September 20001 more than eight years after the thermal image scan
had been conducted on Kyllo's triplex."
WHAT IS A THERMAL IMAGER?
Before examining thermal imaging and its impact upon the
Fourth Amendment, a brief synopsis of the technology is needed to
better understand the constitutional implications. Objects with a tem-
perature above absolute zero emit infrared radiation; the hotter an
object becomes, the more infrared radiation is emitted.' 9 The emitted
radiation is not visible to the human eye because infrared energy
occurs at a rate one thousand times slower than visible light.20 A ther-
mal imager detects infrared emissions, and then converts the heat
readings into a two-dimensional picture, typically black and white.2'
The picture depicts various shades of gray according to how much
radiation the object releases. 2 Hotter objects are lighter in color due
to the fact they radiate more infrared energy, while the cooler objects
15. Id.
16. United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787, 790 (D. Or. 1992), affd in part,
United States v. Kyllo, 26 F.3d 134 (9th Cir. 1994), opinion superseded, United States v.
Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th
Cir. 1998), opinion withdrawn, United States v. Kyllo, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999),
opinion superseded, United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000), rev'd, Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct.
2038 (2001).
17. See Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000).
18. United Sates v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787 (D. Or. 1992), aff'd in part, United
States v. Kyllo, 26 F.3d 134 (9th Cir. 1994), opinion superseded, United States v. Kyllo,
37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir.
1998), opinion withdrawn, United States v. Kyllo, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999),
opinion superseded, United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000), rev'd, Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct.
2038 (2001).
19. Thomas D. Colbridge, Thermal Imaging: Much Heat but Little Light, FBI Law
Enforcement Bull., Dec. 1997, at 18.
20. Mindy G. Wilson, Note, The Prewarrant Use of Thermal Imagery: Has This
Technological Advance in the War Against Drugs Come at the Expense of Fourth
Amendment Protections Against Unreasonable Searches?, 83 Ky. LJ. 891, 892 (1995).
21. See Colbridge, supra note 19, at 18.
22. Id.
2001]
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appear darker.23 A thermal imager is not capable of measuring the
actual temperature of the environment, but detects temperature differ-
entials between the objects and the air temperature. 24 A thermal imag-
ing device does not transmit rays or beams that can penetrate the
home; instead it passively scans thermal energy that is radiated from
the home.25
The United States Army first developed the thermal imager to
assist soldiers in locating enemies during combat.2 6 Today, thermal
imagers serve numerous functions that include finding missing per-
sons, detecting "hot spots" in forest fires hidden by smoke, identifying
inefficient insulation, detecting overloaded powerlines, 27 assisting in
fugitive apprehensions and detecting illegal border crossings. 28
As law enforcement officials throughout the United States have
cracked down on the drug problem which plagues the nation, those
who previously had grown marijuana outdoors turned to indoor culti-
vation where the risk of detection was significantly lower. Thermal
imagers have therefore recently been employed by law enforcement
agencies in the war on drugs to detect excess heat emanating from
private residences - a common indicator of an indoor marijuana
farm. 29 The high intensity bulbs used for indoor cultivation produce
heat of 150 degrees or more Fahrenheit.30 However, the optimal grow-
ing temperature for marijuana plants is between 68 and 72 degrees
Fahrenheit. 3 ' Therefore this excess heat must be vented from indoors
in order to maintain ideal growing conditions; the necessity of venting
excess heat works to the advantage of law enforcement officials who
could scan the suspect's home to determine if emissions were indica-
tive of indoor marijuana operations.32 The two interests at battle in
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Wilson, supra note 20, at 897.
26. Matt Greenberg, Casenote, Warrantless Thermal Imaging May Impermissibly
Invade Home Privacy: United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998), Withdrawn,
1999 WL 548267 (9th Cir. 1999), Superseded on Rehearing by 1999 WL 694733 (9th Cir.
1999), 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 151, 155 (1999).
27. Doyle Baker, Feature, More Heat than Light: Judicial Discord Regarding Thermal
Heat and Imagery and the Fourth Amendment, 32-FEB Prosecutor 16, (1998).
28. Colbridge, supra note 19, at 19.
29. Id.
30. United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8th Cir. 1994).
31. Id. at 1057.
32. See id.
[Vol. 24:53
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the thermal imaging cases are the government's war on drugs and con-
cerns for American civil liberties.33
FOURTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEES
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guaran-
tees citizens their privacy will not be unreasonably invaded by
providing:
(t)he right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 34
The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasion by the
government.
35
The Constitution does not prohibit all searches or seizures, but
only those that are unreasonable. 36 A search is reasonable when con-
ducted according to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment.37 "The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a
decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable govern-
ment interest. ''38 The determination of reasonableness is based upon a
balancing test, weighing the need for government search or seizure
against the individual right to privacy as guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment. 39 The balancing test to determine when the right of pri-
vacy must yield to the right of search is to be determined by a judicial
officer, not a police officer or government agent.40 The need for the
judgment by a judicial officer to be interposed between the citizen and
the police is to ensure a neutral drawing of inferences from the evi-
dence, as opposed to a drawing of inferences by a law enforcement
officer who is "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime. 41 If upon weighing the evidence the neutral judicial officer
decides there is a valid public interest that justifies the intrusion, then
there exists probable cause to issue a search warrant limited to the
33. Joan Biskupic, Justices Rule for Privacy, USA Today, June 12, 2001, at 10A.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
36. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
37. See Camara, 387 U.S. 523.
38. Id. at 539.
39. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
40. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
41. Id.
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necessary scope of investigation. 42 Searches conducted outside the
prescribed judicial process, without prior approval, are per se unrea-
sonable and therefore unconstitutional, unless within one of the lim-
ited exceptions.43
All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is inadmissible against the defendant based upon
the exclusionary principle. 44 The Fourth Amendment protections
against arbitrary government intrusion do not extend to conduct that
is not considered a search or seizure. 45 Therefore, whether govern-
ment conduct is classified as a search or seizure is the pivotal question
in Fourth Amendment analysis; if there is no search or seizure, there is
not a constitutional question.
KATZ AND THE "REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY" TEST
Technological advances since the enactment of the Fourth Amend-
ment have forced courts to expand the concept of what constitutes gov-
ernment invasion beyond purely physical intrusions.46 In Katz v.
United States, the Supreme Court stated that "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places," emphasizing that the scope of the
"Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of physical
intrusion. '47 This holding was contrary to the Court's earlier jurispru-
dence that required a physical trespass in order to constitute an unrea-
sonable search, and demonstrates a broadening of the Fourth
Amendment.48
In Katz, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents had attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of a public tele-
phone booth where the defendant was suspected of transmitting
wagers across state lines.49 The Supreme Court reversed the defen-
dant's conviction because the wiretap created an unconstitutional
search.50 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated that "[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
42. Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Exceptions to the warrant
requirement include: searches incidental to arrest, during hot pursuit, conducted with
consent of the suspect, and possibly searches for national security reasons. Katz, 389
U.S. at 358 nn.20-23.
44. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
45. Baker, supra note 27, at 16.
46. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
47. Id. at 351.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 348.
50. Id. at 359.
[Vol. 24:53
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office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected."'5 1 Justice Harlan's concurrence in
Katz established a two-part inquiry for determining whether there has
been a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment despite
the absence of physical intrusion. 52 The first step of the analysis is to
determine whether a person "exhibited an actual (subjective) expecta-
tion of privacy. ' 53 If this is answered in the affirmative the second step
is to decide whether that expectation is one that "society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable. ' ' 54 The expectation of privacy test estab-
lished in the Katz concurrence has become the lodestar of Fourth
Amendment analysis.
DECISIONS PRIOR TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HEARING
OF KYLLO
Prior to the Supreme Court's granting of certiorari in Kyllo,55
courts that had considered the issue of whether a thermal imaging
device aimed at a private home from public property to detect amounts
of heat emanating into the environment constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment had reached divergent conclusions for differing
reasons.56 The majority of courts considering the question had deter-
mined that a thermal image scan was not a search.57
51. Id. at 351.
52. Id. at 361.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000).
56. Baker, supra note 27, at 18.
57. Jeffrey P. Campisi, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The
Constitutionality of Thermal Imaging, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 241, 249 (2001). Majority courts
finding that thermal imaging is not a search include the Fifth Circuit, see United States
v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995); Seventh Circuit, see United States v. Myers, 46
F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995); Eighth Circuit, see United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056
(8th Cir. 1994); Eleventh Circuit, see United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir.
1994); Arizona Court of Appeals, see State v. Cramer, 851 P.2d 147 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1992); Kentucky Supreme Court, see LaFollette v. Commonwealth, 915 S.W.2d 747
(Ky. 1996); Wisconsin Supreme Court, see State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1993); and the Louisiana Court of Appeals, see State v. Niel, 671 So. 2d 1111 (La.
Ct. App. 1996). Minority courts concluding that the use of a thermal imager
constituted an unreasonable search included the Tenth Circuit, see United States v.
Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 83 F.3d 1247
(10th Cir. 1996); California Court of Appeals, see People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th
1224 (1996); Montana Supreme Court, see State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176 (Mont. 1997),
rev'd on other grounds, State v. Kuneff, 970 P.2d 556 (Mont. 1998); Pennsylvania
20011
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One rationale used by courts when determining whether there
had been a search was based on the fact that a scan can be analogized
to a canine sniff for illegal drugs.58 In United States v. Place, the United
States Supreme Court held that a canine sniff by a well-trained narcot-
ics detection dog is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 59 The rationale for this decision was based upon the lim-
ited and non-intrusive nature of obtaining information.60 The defen-
dant has no reasonable expectation of privacy that society is willing to
accept when the information is escaping into the environment and
being detected by the senses.61 Therefore, any such search is not
unconstitutional.62
Courts which have used the rationale allowing canine sniffs to
decide the thermal imaging question are persuaded by the fact that a
scan simply uses sense-enhancing technology to search for abnormal
heat, just as a trained dog uses his own sense-enhancement to search
for illegal drugs.63 The court in United States v. Pinson stated that
"U]ust as odor escapes a compartment or building and is detected by
the sense-enhancing instrument of a canine sniff, so also does heat
escape a home and is detected by the sense-enhancing [thermal
imager]. ' 64 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Kyllo stated the "scan simply indicated that seemingly anomalous
waste heat was radiating from the outside surface of the home, much
like a trained police dog would be used to indicate that an object was
emitting the odor of illicit drugs. ' 65 The courts that use this analogy
see the thermal imager as no different than a trained police dog, and
rationalize that if a canine sniff is allowed within the Fourth Amend-
Supreme Court, see Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898 (Pa. 1999); and
the Washington Supreme Court, see State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
58. See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1046; Pinson v. United States, 24 F.3d at
1058.
59. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). In Place, however, the court
found that the defendant had been subject to unreasonable search and seizure, not
because of the canine sniff, but because the officers had detained defendant's luggage
for an unreasonable time period. The officers had also failed to tell the defendant
where they were taking the luggage, how long they would keep it, and how they would
return it to him.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. See United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994).
64. Id.
65. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, Kyllo
v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000), rev'd, Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038
(2001).
Vol. 24:53
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ment, the premise follows that a thermal image scan is also
constitutional.66
Courts have also approved the use of thermal imaging because a
scan detects only waste heat.67 Based upon the classification of escap-
ing heat as abandoned, courts then compare the heat released from the
home to discarded garbage.68 In California v. Greenwood, the Court
held that a reasonable expectation of privacy did not exist in garbage
when placed outside the defendant's home for collection; therefore, a
warrantless examination by law enforcement officials did not violate
the Fourth Amendment. 69 The rationale in Greenwood was based
upon the fact that the trash was readily accessible to other members of
the public who were interested in the habits of the defendant,70 and
that the defendant voluntarily placed his trash on the curb for the
express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector. 7'
The combination of these facts evidenced that no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy existed in the garbage placed outside the home.7 In
United States v. Myers, the court reasoned that just as society is unwill-
ing to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left by
the curb, society is also unwilling to recognize an expectation of pri-
vacy in the waste heat released from the home.7 3 The rationale behind
this argument rests on the fact that the excessive heat given from the
high-intensity bulbs is often intentionally vented from the home in
order to keep growing temperatures ideal.74 Because it is unreasonable
to have an expectation of privacy in garbage voluntarily placed on the
curb within the grasps of countless individuals, it follows that it is
unreasonable to have an expectation of privacy in waste heat that is
voluntarily released into the environment awaiting detection by a ther-
mal image scan.75
66. See id.
67. United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 225 (D. Haw. 1991).
68. See id.
69. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). In Greenwood, police used
evidence discovered in defendant's garbage, which was indicative of drug use, to
obtain a search warrant for his home where narcotics were discovered. Defendant
argued probable cause to obtain the search warrant would not have existed but for the
evidence discovered in his garbage.
70. Id. at 40. "It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the
side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops,
and other members of the public."
71. Id. at 40.
72. Id. at 40.
73. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995).
74. United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994).
75. See id.
20011
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Another analogy used by the courts finding that there has been no
Fourth Amendment violation is by comparing the thermal scan to the
plain-view doctrine, reasoning that a thermal scanner is merely
detecting that which is in plain view.76 The courts using this rationale
rely upon the California v. Ciraolo77 and Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States78 decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court
on the same day. In Ciraolo, police had received a tip that marijuana
was being grown in the defendant's backyard that was enclosed by two
fences and shielded from view at ground level.79 Officers secured a
private plane and flew over the defendant's home at an altitude of
1,000 feet, whereby they were able to identify marijuana plants grow-
ing in the backyard.80 The Supreme Court employed the reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis to determine whether there had been a
search, and determined that "[iun an age where private and commer-
cial flight in public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respon-
dent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally
protected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of
1,000 feet."81 Therefore, the officers' conduct was not a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.8 2
In Dow Chemical Company, 3 the United States Supreme Court
held that aerial photography of a chemical company's industrial com-
plex was not a search for purpose of the Fourth Amendment.84 The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had been denied on-site
inspection of Dow's industrial complex and therefore employed a com-
mercial aerial photographer who used a standard precision aerial map-
ping camera to take pictures of the facility to ensure the company was
operating within the EPA's guidelines.85 The Court attached signifi-
cance to the fact that the EPA was not using a unique sensory device
but rather used a "conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera
commonly used in mapmaking."86 The Court continued by stating,
76. United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 856 (5th Cir. 1995). This analogy
greatly enlarges the plain-view doctrine, which previously had been limited to
discovery through natural senses.
77. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
78. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
79. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 215.
82. Id.
83. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
84. See id.
85. Id. at 229.
86. Id. at 238.
[Vol. 24:53
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[i]t may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance of pri-
vate property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment
not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might
be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant. But the photographs
here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional
concerns.
8 7
The dictum of the Court in both of these cases which emphasizes
the "routine" use of the airplane88 and use of equipment "generally
available to the public" has a huge implication in the Court's holding
in Kyllo.
Using these cases as reference for the plain view doctrine, lower
courts have decided that a thermal imager is not a search within the
Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Ishmael, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that use of a thermal imager was not a search
within the Fourth Amendment because the device was not illegally
used while on the defendant's property, and thus the law enforcement
officials were able to use the available technology to observe the defen-
dant's building and the heat being emitted.8 9 The officers were enti-
tled to observe the building because it stood in an open field, and the
fact that the officers enhanced their observations with a thermal
imager did not require a different conclusion. 90
The minority view, prior to the United States Supreme Court
granting of certiorari in Kyllo, 9 ' placed emphasis not on the expecta-
tion of privacy in the heat emitted from the home, the approach taken
by the majority view courts, but rather emphasized the expectation of
privacy in the activities conducted within the home.92 In Common-
wealth v. Gindelsperger, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that
that, "these devices do, in fact, reveal intimate details regarding activi-
ties occurring within the sanctity of the home, the place deserving the
utmost protection pursuant to the Fourth Amendment." 93 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeals in People v. Deutsch, stated that "because the ther-
mal imager is indiscriminate in registering sources of heat it is an
intrusive tool, which tells much about the activities inside the home
which may be quite unrelated to any illicit activity."9 4 This illustrates
that the minority-view courts were concerned with protecting the activ-
87. Id.
88. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
89. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
90. Id.
91. See Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000).
92. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1501 (10th Cit. 1995).
93. Commonwealth v. Gindelsperger, 743 A.2d 898, 902 (Pa. 1999).
94. People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1231 (1996).
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ities within the curtilage of the home, and did not attach significance
to the expectation in privacy of excess heat being detected by
unknown technology.
Minority view courts also looked to the United States Supreme
Court's rulings in United States v. Knotts 9 and United States v. Karo.96
In Knotts, the Supreme Court held that monitoring the beeper signals
on a chloroform container did not invade any legitimate expectation of
privacy by the government, and therefore was not a Fourth Amend-
ment violation. 97 The fact that the officers used the beeper to track the
container, which could have been done solely by police surveillance,
did not alter the analysis, for nothing in the Fourth Amendment pro-
hibited the police from augmenting their sensory faculties with science
and technology enhancements.9" However, the Court placed much
emphasis in its ruling on the fact that there was no indication that the
beeper revealed information as to the movement of the chloroform
container in the cabin owned by the defendant, nor revealed other facts
that would not have been visible to the naked eye from outside the
cabin.9 9
In United States v. Karo, the Court again considered the Fourth
Amendment implications of using a monitoring beeper. 100 However,
the Court stated this case was different from Knotts' 01 where the
beeper did not tell authorities anything about the interior of Knotts'
cabin, but rather revealed only information that could have been
obtained by anyone who wanted to look.10 2 In Karo the government
used the beeper in a private residence, where individual expectations
of privacy are at their highest, and not open to visual surveillance. 10 3
The Court notes the use of an electronic device is less intrusive than a
full-scale search, but here it did reveal critical facts about the interior of
the premises electronically, which could not have been obtained by
observation from outside the curtilage of the home, and therefore
undiscoverable without a warrant. 10 4 The Court found that the use of
the monitoring beeper within the private residence was a violation of
the Fourth Amendment noting that, "[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of
95. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
96. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
97. See Knotts, 460 U.S. 276.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Karo, 468 U.S. 705.
101. See Knotts, 460 U.S. 276.
102. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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property that has been withdrawn from public view would present far
too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely
some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight."' 0 5 The minority courts
have drawn a comparison between Karo and the use of a thermal
imager, finding that officials could not have discovered the presence of
marijuana growing operations without a search warrant unless they
used the thermal imager. 1
0 6
THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING ON THERMAL IMAGING
In what has been characterized as an unusual alignment of jus-
tices, in a 5-4 ruling the United States Supreme Court, majority opin-
ion written by Justice Anton Scalia, 107 held "where . . . the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore
details of a private home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment
'search', and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. '"108
The Court began its analysis by focusing on the guarantees of pri-
vacy and the emphasis placed by the Fourth Amendment on the home,
stating that "[alt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion."'1 9 With few exceptions, the
warrantless search of a home is unreasonable. 1 0 The Court goes on
to note that this case is not a simple one under the existing precedent,
due to the fact that well into the twentieth century, Fourth Amendment
analysis was tied to common law trespass."' The majority explains
that the question the Court must confront is "what limits there are
upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed
privacy.""12
The majority rejected the distinction between "off-the-wall" obser-
vations and "through-the-wall" surveillance. 113 The dissent argues that
there should be a differentiation between scans that simply detect
emitted heat, referred to as "off-the wall," and scans that can detect
105. Id. at 716.
106. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 906.
107. Edward Walsh, High-Tech Devices Require a Warrant, The Washington Post, June
12, 2001, at Al. The majority opinion included Justices Scalia, Thomas, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer.
108. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2046.
109. Id. at 2041 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
110. Id. at 2042.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2043.
113. Id. at 2044.
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activity within the house, "through-the-wall."' 1 4 The dissent states that
a scan determined to be "through-the-wall" should be found to consti-
tute an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment;
while a finding of "off-the-wall" imaging should be considered reasona-
ble without the issuing of a warrant.' 15 The majority compares the
argument that the thermal imager detected only radiated heat from
external surfaces with the fact that a microphone placed outside the
house would pick up only sound emanating from within.1 16 The
Court found that such a mechanical interpretation had been rejected
in Katz," 7 The Court stated:
[r]eversing that approach would leave the homeowner at the mercy of
advancing technology-including imaging technology that could dis-
cern all human activity in the home. While the technology used in the
present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account
of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development. 8
The majority of the Court also rejects the Government's argument
that the imaging was constitutional because it did not "detect private
activities occurring within private areas," because in the home "all
details are intimate details, [and] the entire area is held safe from pry-
ing government eyes.""' 9 The Fourth Amendment's guarantee of sanc-
tity to the home has never been tied to the quality of the information
obtained during the investigation. 120 The majority felt holding the use
of thermal imagers as unconstitutional was necessary in order to main-
tain a "firm line at the entrance to the house."'12 1
Also the limitation of use of the thermal imager to scan for only
those details which are not "intimate" would be impossible for law
enforcement officials to apply because an officer would not be able to
know in advance whether his scan would pick up intimate details, and
would be unable to determine upfront whether his scan was constitu-
tional. 1 22 Such an unpredictable definition would be counterproduc-
114. Id. at 2047.
115. See id.
116. Id. See also Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
117. Id.
118. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2044.
119. Id. at 2045 (emphasis in original).
120. Id. at 2045. There is no connection between the sophistication of the
surveillance equipment and the "intimacy" of the details, noting for example that the
Agema Thermovision 210 used to scan Kyllo's home could disclose at what hour each
night the lady of the house takes her daily bath, which most would consider intimate.
121. Id. at 2046 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
122. Id.
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tive to the officers trying to gather information for a probable cause
hearing. 123  An "intimate" details standard would be absolutely
unworkable, requiring constant litigation to determine what society
considers intimate.' 24 The majority also found the government's argu-
ment that the thermal image scan did not reveal details about the
home unpersuasive, because the exact purpose of using the thermal
imager is to determine whether marijuana is being grown inside the
home. 125
The majority of the Court agrees with the government that the
Fourth Amendment never required "law enforcement officers to shield
their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares.' 1 26 This
statement preserves the lawfulness of warrantless visual surveillance
and upholds the plain view doctrine.'12  However, the majority feels
the use of a thermal imager involves more than naked-eye surveil-
lance.' 28 In previous cases, the Court reserved judgment on how
much technological enhancement of ordinary perception would still be
considered visual observation. 129 In Dow Chemical Company, the
Court upheld enhanced aerial photography of an industrial plant, but
was careful to note that the area viewed was not an area "immediately
adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most
heightened."'130 It also found that the camera used was not a unique
sensory device, which is a crucial question in the Kyllo analysis.13 '
The Court therefore rejects the notion that a thermal image scan can
be analogized to the plain view doctrine, at least as long as the scanner
is not in general public use.' 32
The pivotal factor in the Court's bright-line test is that the device
used by the government must not be in general public use in order to
constitute an unreasonable search without a warrant. 33 The dissent
takes issue with this element and posits that the majority is introduc-
ing uncertainty into the Fourth Amendment analysis, rather than
drawing a bright-line.' 34 The dissent states, "[hiow much use is gen-
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 2043 n.2.
126. Id. at 2042 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2043.
129. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 237.
130. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2046.
134. Id. at 2050.
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eral public use is not even hinted at by the Court's opinion, which
makes the somewhat doubtful assumption that the thermal imager
used in this case does not satisfy that criterion."' 35 The dissent is not
only concerned about the vagueness of the rule, but is also fearful that
the "threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, as the use of intru-
sive equipment becomes more readily available.' 1 36 The majority's
response to this criticism is answered in footnote six of the majority
opinion, which states that the dissenters' disagreement is not with the
majority, but rather with the Supreme Court's precedent. 137 The major-
ity referred to the holding in Ciraolo,'38 which denominated the flights
in public airways as routine, therefore preventing the defendant from
having a reasonable expectation that his plants could not be observed
from 1,000 feet above.' 3 9 The Supreme Court concludes that the use
of a thermal imager is not routine, and therefore declines to reexamine
the factor already established by precedent. 140
The dissent also challenges the majority's lack of judicial
restraint.' 4  The dissent contends that the issue should have properly
been resolved with reference solely to the capabilities of the Agema
Thermovision 210.142 However, the majority opinion states that
although "the technology used in the present case was relatively crude,
the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems
that are already in use or in development.' 1 43 The dissent believes
such questions about future advances and capabilities would be best
decided at a later date, thus giving legislators an opportunity to grap-
ple with the emerging technology, rather than shackling them with pre-
mature constitutional guidelines.' 44
Is KYLLO's HOLDING SOUND?
The bright-line rule announced in Kyllo appears to be more fuzzy
than bright. The dissent's attacks show the gaping holes in the major-
ity's holding. What exactly is the definition of "general public use"?
How does one go about identifying whether a device meets this defini-
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2046 n.6.
138. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
139. id.
140. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2046 n.6.
141. Id. at 2052.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2044.
144. Id. at 2052.
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tion? Does general public use imply that commercial availability is
enough? Does it mean that one in ten people must own a thermal
imager, or does it mean one out of ten thousand must own? Does
general public use imply that one must be able to go to the local dis-
count store to pick up a thermal imager? Does general public use
mean one is able to obtain access to a thermal imager over the
Internet? Considering that thermal imaging is not limited to law
enforcement, at what point does it become so prevalent enough to be
considered in general public use? These are a small sampling of possi-
ble questions behind the Court's bright-line established in Kyllo
requiring the device to be in "general public use" in order to be classi-
fied as a reasonable search without a warrant. However, the Court
gives no guidance as to how the element of "general public use" should
be applied. A bright-line rule is typically intended to establish clear-
cut procedure for analyzing an issue. However, this holding makes it
impossible to clearly assess when the use of technology will be consid-
ered a search within the Fourth Amendment.
The application of this bright-line is not only ambiguous, but even
suggests by its very language it is merely temporary. Bill Stuntz, a
Harvard Law School Professor, stated, "[t]wenty years from now you
may be able to buy thermal imaging technology at a Wal-Mart....
[tihen either we get less privacy or the court has to draw another
line."145 The approach taken by the Court seems to open more ques-
tions than resolve answers. One of the overriding questions is, how
long will the holding of Kyllo survive?
Lack of judicial restraint is another reason the Court's decision
presents such problems. Judicial restraint is the philosophy of limiting
decisions to the facts of each case, deciding only those issues that
must be decided to resolve the case, and avoiding unnecessarily deci-
sions on constitutional issues. The Court violated all the aspects of
this philosophy. Instead of simply addressing the limited factual situa-
tion presented and the limited technology that is currently available,
the Court decided to make a ruling with possible future advances in
mind and unnecessarily decided constitutional issues that were not
before the Court. The Court's ruling is based on the belief that one
day thermal images will be capable of seeing through the walls of a
home, and detecting all activities going on inside. The Court's
approach in Kyllo is opposite of that taken by the Supreme Court in
Silverman v. United States,14 6 where the Court stated:
145. See Walsh, supra note 107, at Al.
146. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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[tihe facts of the present case, however, do not require us to consider
the large questions which have been argued. We need not here con-
template the Fourth Amendment implications of these and other fright-
ening paraphernalia which the vaunted marvels of an electronic age
may visit upon human society.
1 4 7
The Court's abandonment of the deeply instilled philosophy of judi-
cial restraint reeks havoc on its ruling by unnecessarily looking to pos-
sible future advances and conflicts. As a result, the holding of Kyllo
will be short-lived before revamping or completely abandoning the
decision becomes a necessity.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps American homes are more private today than they were
before June 11, 2001. But the question remains: how long will this
privacy last? Will the ruling established by the Supreme Court in
Kyllo with the stated objective of protecting privacy, actually result in a
reduction of American civil liberties? Only time will answer this ques-
tion; yet it is unlikely that Kyllo will be the United States Supreme
Court's last word on the issue of thermal imaging and its Fourth
Amendment implications.
Sarilyn E. Hardee
147. Id.
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